Following on my previous blog entry, “Our Criteria of Rightness: 6th Installment”:
We feel very comfortable understanding our own viewpoint as representing the way the world is or as an accurate rendering of the world as it is in itself. And, correspondingly, we judge an opposing view as off and not capturing things as they are. Consequently, we both develop explanations for how our intellectual opponent could be so off in their beliefs about how things should be and are, and we have the experience of perplexity at how they could believe something so different from us.
I think that we all have that feeling of ourselves as being sturdily planted in rightness while our opponents are hopelessly muddled.
But it is readily admitted by the masters of reason - philosophers - that our rational worldviews are based on rational intuitions, i.e. rational assumptions which cannot be further justified. There are very few epistemological foundationalists left. But if our views cannot demonstrate their origin in the way the world is - the one and only reality - and if that is also true of our opponents, then we should also take a look at why we believe what we believe beyond the reasons we give for believing what we believe.We feel comfortable residing in the ultimately unsupportable perspective we take on how things are and some comfort in explaining the blind spots, stupidity and obstinance of people with opposing views, but we rarely wonder about the psychological origins of our own attachments to our beliefs. Not just what we come to think of as mistaken beliefs, but also what we consider correct beliefs. For if the way the world is cannot be shown to sanction or justify these beliefs, we can rightly wonder about their origins.
It’s comfortable to examine the extra rational causes of our opponent's beliefs, but we rarely inquire into the extra rational causes of our own beliefs.
5 comments:
Thinking about the extra rational causes of our beliefs, It seems obvious they're connected with our basic emotions and wishes. And these emotions are influenced by social factors.
Certain emotions trigger (or predispose) specific worldviews (modified by the specific culture). As an example, socialists tend to be people lacking of money and wealth, and feel insecure of their own individual power. It's not absolute, but it's easier be socialist to a proletarian than to a capitalist.
However, as explained by philosopher Ludwig von Mises in his book "Marxism Unmasked" and other books, theorist of socialism (like Marx and Engels) weren't proletarian (Engels was, in fact, a capitalist). Mises's free online e-book "Maxism Unmasked" can be downloaded here:
http://www.fee.org/pdf/books/marxismunmasked.pdf
Point is that, as far it isn't absolute (because it seems to have some exceptions), people choose their beliefs by emotional and psychological reasons. And these reasons are connected with socio-cultural conditions of the specific person.
Jeff, I suggest you to systematize your views from a philosophy-system perspective. I mean, try to establish the most probable psychological causes (or personality type) of the different philosophical positions, for example (these are speculations of mine):
1)Positivists can't handle incertainty and tend to intolerant and dogmatic. They need absolute truth to feel secure.
2)Posmodernists can't handle dogmatism and certainty. They need total freedom (including the freedom of intellectual dogmas of modern reason)
3)Communists doubts of their own individual abilities, and they search in groups their own security. The group is a substitute of their lack of personal(individual) power.
4)Libertatian feels fine and confident with their individual capabilities, and try to get their goals stressing individualism and personal independence.
5)Materialists feel good with the idea of our basic personal irrelevance, our accidental and insignificant existence as a by-product of nature, our radical dependence of material causes and our lack of objective purpose and meaning for life. They want to believe that our destiny will be the permanent extinction after death.
6)Spiritualists feel insecure with the above idea, and wants to believe that their existence is more than our temporal material (and accidental) existence. That spirit will have another chance after death, and that material universe is less important than us.
These are some speculations of mine; maybe they're total or partially false. But the point is that most people choose a worldview consistent (or non-contradictory) with their basic emotions, wishes and interests.
Yes, socio-cultural conditions affect emotional dispositions and so beliefs and we can try to characterize the larger trends, but I focus on the individual, psychological causes of particular sets of basic beliefs. So two or more people in a discussion find themselves fundamentally opposed in their views yet have run out of non-circular reasons for justifying their views. What to do? Well, we can ask how they have different views if they've run out of reasons to justify their views. An answer: they are attached to their views for other, non-rational reasons. For many this ends the discussion but I am contending that there is a lot to be learned about the character and quality of those non-rational attachments. A psychoanalytic-type of reflection is one way.
Your example of Marx and Engels being non-working class can be explained socially by understanding their use of socialism and the ideology of Marxism as a means for a new elite to try to take power. This new elite is a class of intellectuals - like Lenin, Castro, Ho Chi Minh - who want to overthrow the then current elite of capitalist property owners. The sociologist Alvin Gouldner wrote about this.
Yes, I think one can make a character typology as you did. Although I wonder if you favor libertarianism, because one could also speculate that libertarians have difficulty with social connections and mutuality and so advocate strongly individual liberty. This kind of positive and negative characterization of differing belief-systems would be revealing of the systematizers own predilections.
But I focus on the way in which an individual, personalized examination of one's own emotional/psychological attachment to beliefs can be investigated to further thought and discussion.
Hi Jeff,
I've thought that, if your views about the non-rational reasons of people's worldview are correct, a tipology correlating specific personality/psychological types with specific worldview is inevitable.
For instance, let's take libertarianism. You mention: "libertarians have difficulty with social connections and mutuality and so advocate strongly individual liberty"
I'd add:
1)Libertarians have been succesful in one-on-one competition; so they have confidence in themselves (as individuals). They built their confidence and self-esteem through of individuality.
2)They learned that, as individuals, they're "superior" to the group or the "mass". So, they lack confindence in colective solutions or actions.
3)Many of them have grow up in good economic conditions, so they have a emotional attachment to expensive objects and the corresponding social prestige. They need the social recognition of society, based upon the conquist or property of expensive object (some surveys shows that rich people has more credibility and prestige in the most people's eyes)
Some of the above factors (including your observation) can explain the preference for libertarianism as a basic beliefs. Maybe there are other factors.
Am I a libertarian? Honestly, I'm very critic of socialism, specially of marxism (my "intellectual" journey consisted of reading many anti-marxian literature).
But I'm an skeptical of libertarianism. I confess you that my current position on that topic is indefinite. (But I prefer a libertarian society like USA that a communist society like Cuba)
Jeff, another interesting aspect of you view is the folowing: the non-rational reasons to our worldview affect our evaluation of these reasons?
I mean, if I explore the non-rational reasons of a communist or libertarian, is it not possible a disagreement about that interpretation, based upon different psychological criteria for that evaluation of these non-rational reasons? Maybe, a psychoanalist would interpret the non-rational reasons from a different point of view that a cognitive psychologist or a behaviourist.
Aren't we assuming that the evaluation of the non-rational reasons of people's beliefs is, in itself, objective and a-problematic?
What do you think?
I don't think a typology of worldviews and personality types is inevitable. It can be done, I was just saying it wasn't my interest and I think there are problems with it. People's relationship to their beliefs is so varied that I think it requires an individualized approach. A unique individual, either alone or with another, examining their particular relationship to their beliefs and
convictions.
I thought that the typology you gave made the socialist sound like their connection to their beliefs suggested negative attachments while the libertarian seemed to have positive attachments. I thought you might have seen it this way because of a preference for libertarianism and an aversion to socialism. So I thought of a relationship between the libertarian's psyche and beliefs that sounded negative - a problem with social relating. I just wanted to illustrate a problem with these kinds of generalized typologies. You can characterize
different worldviews negatively or positively. Any given individual can have a healthy or unhealthy relation to their worldview. (Although, now that I think
about it, would we want to characterize a person with a fascist worldview as having a healthy relationship to their view? My opposing, anti-fascist
worldview must contain an implicit negative valuation of the fascist.)
A given libertarian may be a failure in their one-to-one competitions and so use
libertarianism to compensate. Randians may be like this. But as you say, it could be that any given libertarian was successful in a competition and so adopt a supportive ideology like libertarianism. I'm just saying that the same worldview can have differing psychological purposes in the psychological make-up
of an individual.
I'm glad you can be skeptical of libertarianism, not because libertarianism is so bad but because I think it's good to be skeptical. Certainly, Cuba is a repressive society. But the socialism or market socialism or welfare-state capitalism of some European countries doesn't have the political repressiveness of the communist societies.
Yes, the evaluations of the non-rational reasons will arise from other parts of the person's
Worldview and not be absolutely objective. I do presuppose some type of psychoanalytic investigation. A cognitive-behaviorist probably wouldn't do the kind of investigation I suggest. But I do feel there is a naturalness to asking: Why do you believe that? What’s the character of the emotions behind you’re attachment to that belief since you fail now to come up with more reasons for believing? In contemporary analytic philosophy they call these non-rational beliefs “rational intuitions.” Why hold particular ones and not others? Why choose the approach of phenomenology as opposed to analytic philosophy of mind?
And yes, there’s no objective determining of why a person is attached as they are to their beliefs. That’s another reason I don’t pursue the typologies you describe. I imagine the investigation of the non-rational basis of beliefs as a kind of practice of the self. A way to learn about oneself and develop oneself and develop one’s thinking. So the criterion is pragmatic. Does it enlighten the investigator? Does it further a stuck debate? Not, is it objectively correct? We’d ask: objectively correct according to what criteria of correctness? And then we’d ask: why adopt that criteria of correctness?
Hi Jeff,
I forget to reply to your comment:
I don't think a typology of worldviews and personality types is inevitable. It can be done, I was just saying it wasn't my interest and I think there are problems with it
I thought it could be of your interest, because you have interest in philosophy and psychology, not only in psychotherapy.
It's truth that there are problems with it. But in philosophy, there are many problems with many topics but it's not reason to avoid explore the field.
Maybe you're interested only in exploring specific individual's biography and its relationship with philosophy. But I guess other philosophers or scientists (or lay people like me) will have interest in a more general typology based upon your thesis.
People's relationship to their beliefs is so varied that I think it requires an individualized approach. A unique individual, either alone or with another, examining their particular relationship to their beliefs and
convictions
Yes, it's a good point. But I think there are common denominators in all the people who shares a similar worldview, because the psychological function of specific beliefs is limited. At least, I consider it a reasonable hypothesis.
I'm just saying that the same worldview can have differing psychological purposes in the psychological make-up
of an individual
Yes, I understand your point. But it doesn't contradict mine. I also think the same worldview can play different psycholical roles... but not any role.
I mean, I think a specific worldview have some different (but not infinite)purposes in the psychology of each individual; but these purposes are limited, and they could be integrated in a topology integrating all of them.
Let's suppose the role of a socialist worldview. It could support the satisfaciton of the following psychological needs:
1)The need for justice (maybe in some guy who was victim of injustice)
2)The need for material equality (maybe in someone who was poor, or saw poor people around him)
And any other purposes. But hardly we'd argue that socialism is hold by the following needs:
1)The need for a post-mortem survival to avoid fear of death (in that case, the person would chose some religion or some spiritualistic practique)
2)The need for personal recognition through individual wealth and fame. That need will tend to make the person prone to capitalism and libertarianism, not to socialism.
So, my point is that it's possible to discover the most common psychological needs corresponding to specific worldview. It won't be a 100% infalible typology, but psychology isn't a exact science, and a margin of error could always be present.
Certainly, Cuba is a repressive society. But the socialism or market socialism or welfare-state capitalism of some European countries doesn't have the political repressiveness of the communist societies
I agree. I was using the concept of socialism in the classical sense: a system based on the public property of the means of production, with a central planification of all the economy and without market prices.
Yes, the evaluations of the non-rational reasons will arise from other parts of the person's
Worldview and not be absolutely objective. I do presuppose some type of psychoanalytic investigation
I know. But the practical problem with it is that your method only would work with people who accept psychoanalityc investigations.
So, if I'm debating with a positivist, and we get to point where our "rational intuitions" meet, your method won't be useful to continue the debate about our respective non-rational beliefs, because in that case the positivist probably reject the psychoanalytic invesitgation as a pseudoscientific and sterile procedure. On the contrary, a psychoanalyst probably would have serious interest in it.
I imagine the investigation of the non-rational basis of beliefs as a kind of practice of the self. A way to learn about oneself and develop oneself and develop one’s thinking. So the criterion is pragmatic. Does it enlighten the investigator? Does it further a stuck debate? Not, is it objectively correct? We’d ask: objectively correct according to what criteria of correctness? And then we’d ask: why adopt that criteria of correctness?
Yes, and it's a good thing. But in my opinion your thesis is very useful to philosophical debate too, not only to develop's one thinking in a psychotherapeutic context.
I think your thesis about beliefs and philosophy is a very good and original one, and it shouldn't be restricted only to psychotherapy or auto-analysis. In my opinion, your thesis has important implications to epistemology and other fields of philosophy.
And I think it's useful and interesting to explore those implications. At least, it's very interesting for me, and I try to use what I've learned from you to discover tacit assumptions and point of disagreement in philosophical debates. (Also, I use it to discover my bias and emotional prejudices in favor or against certain ideas)
I've learned a lot from the ideas of your blog. :-)
ZC
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