Tuesday, December 02, 2008
Examining Experience
It’s odd that there should be so much philosophical talk about qualia, sense-datum, raw feels and other names for the contents of our subjective experience and so little time spent examining them subjectively. Philosophers generally respect the methods of the natural sciences yet ignore a mode of examination of subjective experience which can afford a better examination of it. The method amounts to looking more closely. This is the method of mindfulness meditation in Buddhism. One sits still, closes the eyes and “watches,” experiences consciously or examines the arising and passing of thoughts, emotions or feelings and sensations. It may be objected that mindful examination of subjective experience is not a transparent or simple examining, but the same could be said for the microscope. The method itself is quite simple. Sit still for a longish period of time – longer than we normally sit still – and examine the contents of experience as they arise. The experience is one of seeing what is already there but more closely. We already do this in small doses when we check in to know what we are feeling. So why not look more closely for a sustained amount of time? It’s odd that a field with a strong empiricist tradition wouldn’t think to examine their subject matter more closely.
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3 comments:
Hi Jeff,
As awalys, your posts are very good.
Philosophers generally respect the methods of the natural sciences yet ignore a mode of examination of subjective experience which can afford a better examination of it
I think the reason for that is that most philosophers are materialists. Materialism, in its most extreme forms (e.g. eliminative materialism) denies the existence of subjetive experience as something real.
Other less extreme materialist/physicalists doctrines consider the subjetive experience as existent but non-efficacious by-product of the brain. If it's true, then introspection isn't possible, because it entails that mental experiences can have causal efficacy over the own subjetive experience.
But epiphenomena are, by definition, non-efficacious. And introspection, as a mental/subjetive procedure for research subjetive experience, can't produce any effect either (including the effect to give us a knowledge about our own mind). In a physicalist worldview, only physical phenomena are real and causally efficient.
An excellent critical analysis of epiphenomenism may be read in this paper:
http://www.geocities.com/athanasiafoundation/epiphenomenalism.html
Jeff, a book that could be of your interest is philosopher David Ray Griffin's book "Unsnarling the world-knot". Based on the philosophy of Alfred Whitehead, he argues for an alternative to materialism and dualism that he calls "pamexperientialism".
I think Griffin's view resolves some of the current problems on consciousness, and offers room for techniques as instrospection, meditation and other practiques that often are dismissed or ignored by materialists.
Happy new year!!!
ZC
Jeff, in my last comment, I forget to recommend another great book that could be of your (and your readers) interest:
The taboo of subjetivity by Allan Wallace. It specially examines one of the remarks posed in your post: "It’s odd that a field with a strong empiricist tradition wouldn’t think to examine their subject matter more closely"
Wallace is a trained scientist and philosopher, expert in Buddhism (Wallace spent fourteen years as a Buddhist monk and was ordained by the Dalai Lama, and he's translated many Tibetan Buddhist texts)
He has other excellent books on science, philosophy and consciousness.
His website:
http://www.alanwallace.org/
All the best,
ZC
Hi Z,
Thanks for the recommendations. I read Griffin years ago but not that book and have a book by Wallace, "Choosing Reality."
I've been reading Slavoj Zizek lately and am trying to start a reading group of his work.
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