The blog “The Joy of Curmudgeonry” has criticisms of Richard Rorty’s philosophy. The blog’s author employs a common technique which is interesting to psychoanalyze. He takes a one or two sentence quote from Rorty and then “refutes” him. This technique is in contrast to the usual critical method of grasping a thinker's overall argument and responding to it. This facile technique is done more with Rorty and, more generally, with people who are strongly antithetical or fundamentally undermining of the critic’s position. Examples I’ve seen of this technique are numerous: several critics’ responses to Noam Chomsky’s radical political critiques; the analytical philosopher Rudolph Carnap’s making the continental philosopher Martin Heidegger look ridiculous by quoting a particularly abstruse passage without any context; Noam Chomsky calling the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan an “amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan.”; several critics of Jacques Derrida.
The critic’s criticism usually has an air of dismissiveness. The opponent is not worthy of consideration because their view is so wrong-headed that it can be disposed of easily. Yet what’s interesting is that the opposite is the case. The opponent’s view is so radical that it challenges the basis of the critic’s worldview and so is profoundly threatening. When the target of the criticism can make a fundamentally opposed worldview plausible and compelling (and I find all the above named thinkers compelling) it relativizes the critic’s worldview. It’s the profundity of the threat and not the foolishness of the thought that causes the threatened critic to act as if their opponent cannot be taken seriously.
If Rorty were as easily dismissable as the curmudgeon of the blog suggests why are twelve of the top philosophers in the world responding to Rorty’s work in the collection Rorty and His Critics? If he is that easily dismissable what is going on in the book? As we might expect from a knowledge of psychoanalysis, the critic’s tone of easy dismissal hides its opposite. In psychology it’s called a reaction formation. We feel and express consciously an emotion opposite to the one we are unconsciously feeling underneath it. A smug confidence in one’s rightness masks the vulnerable fear of a threat.
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8 comments:
Ya see, this is exactly why I totally dig your stuff! I so adore your inclusion of relevant depth psychology to help shed light (or perhaps a different kind of light) on various subjects.
I quite agree with your take on the "air of dismissivenes." Having worked on my own for quite a number of years as well as others through the counseling relationship, I see dissmissiveness as a very passive-aggressive move against what is perceived as too scary.
What continually strikes me about most folks is their complete LACK of curiousity about themselves, others, and the world around them. The dissmissive tone that many folks hold brings with it the stench of exclusion, self-righteousnous, and at times radical 'isms' of various types.
And then what's so interesting to me about this is, taking Rorty's view, one could actually include MORE into one's world view, having ditched the cruth and false need to continually match up predicates with reality. So, perhaps a really good sign of mental (and philosophical) health would be the approach that embraces more? One that is more inclusive.
Cheers,
-Joshua
Hi Jeff,
I was thinking about some questions, I'd like to know your opinion:
-One of the most powerful arguments for scientism is that it "works". In other words, the extraordinary sucess of science gives plausibility to the idea that the world is actually like it's presented by natural science.
What do you think about this argument for absolutist scientism?
-Do you think that relativism or perspectivism is valid regarding moral values too?
I mean, are moral values and moral propositions true or false relative to a certain perspective, and is there no absolute perspective of morality?
In other matter, you know there is a contemporary debate between atheists (Richard Dawkins, etc.) and theists.
As far I can see, both sides of the debate agree with absolutism, not with relativism. Leaving aside the question of who has better arguments, fact is absolutism is part of analytic philosophy of religion.
However, I've just seen a philosopher of religion named Nick Trakakis who has just published the book "The End of Philosophy of Religion", who defends a position similar to yours (i mean, a position sympathetic to the critical exposing of the assumptions of the positions under debate).
I haven't read this book, but in amazon you can read this description "This is an expert examination of the 'meta-philosophy of religion', exposing the limitations of the analytic method and the need to embrace a new continental approach. "The End of Philosophy of Religion" explores the hitherto un-chartered waters of the 'meta-philosophy of religion', that is, the methods and assumptions underlying the divergent ways of writing and studying the philosophy of religion that have emerged over the last century. It is also a first-class study of the weaknesses of the analytic approach in philosophy, particularly when it is applied to religious and aesthetic experience.Nick Trakakis' main line of argument is twofold. Firstly, the Anglo-American analytic tradition of philosophy, by virtue of its attachment to scientific norms of rationality and truth, inevitably struggles to come to terms with the mysterious and transcendent reality that is disclosed in religious practice. Secondly, and more positively, alternatives to analytic philosophy of religion are available, not only within the various schools of so-called Continental philosophy, but also in explicitly narrative and literary approaches. He argues that literature (using examples from Dostoyevsky and Kazantzakis) can often promise greater philosophical insight than what is usually offered in the purely academic and highly professionalized settings of contemporary philosophy.Trakakis expertly shows that continental philosophers do not surrender 'clarity' to analytic philosophy; emphasising instead that one has to distinguish clarity from rigor, (being faithful to the phenomena). When things are ambiguous it distorts them to treat them as if they were clear, but it is rigorous to respect their ambiguity and to attempt to express them in words, like a master poet or novelist. "The End of Philosophy of Religion" proposes that the pervasive analytic approach to the philosophic study of religion is fraught with limitations, and that a new continental approach must be embraced if advances are to be made"
Finally, and in other topic, I just read philosopher Alex Rosemberg's blog article on naturalism:
http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disenchanted-naturalists-guide-to-reality/
I think his view tends to be very nihilistic, but he's possibly right that those are the true implications of that worldview.
ZC
Hi Joshua,
Thanks for the comments.
I know what you mean about "What continually strikes me about most folks is their complete LACK of curiousity about themselves, others, and the world around them."
Most people simply talk about themselves (without curiousity). They think it enough in a conversation to wait their turn and then say "I liked 'Avatar'" or "Oh, I hate pickled herring." (And we all know that pickled herring is actually quite good.)
My friend from California, who's a subtle student of narcissism, says this is symptomatic of a pervasive social-psychological narcissism.
At least it helps to employ therapists because there's no one else who really listens.
Jeff
Jeff,
Pickled herring, huh? Never tried it, but I'm up for anything. :)
I know you get tons of books and authors suggested to you, but I'm gonna do the same. A. H. Almass.
This guy has developed what he calls "The Diamond Approach" which appears to be a synthesis of many different types of Eastern practice and Western psychology.
I'm currently reading a book (The Void) which is an amazingly lucid and "grabable" analysis about the experience of spaciousness.
Going back to the notion of dismissiveness and social-psychological narcissim, Almass's handy integration of East and West surgically describes how we clutter ourselves with extra bits of psychic detritus, actually decreasing our ability to experience spaciousness/expansiveness.
Do check it out. You're inner journey will thank you. :)
Hi Z,
Part I of reply. (Sorry it took so long.)
I was thinking about some questions, I'd like to know your opinion:
-One of the most powerful arguments for scientism is that it "works". In other words, the extraordinary sucess of science gives plausibility to the idea that the world is actually like it's presented by natural science.
What do you think about this argument for absolutist scientism?
* It’s a pragmatic argument: “it works.” Not a metaphysical argument: the world is really like the way science describes it. Astrology “works” for people. Psychoanalysis “works” for people. Does that mean the world is really like they say it is? Scientifically they don’t hold up. That’s a limitation of using science as the ultimate criterion of reality.
-Do you think that relativism or perspectivism is valid regarding moral values too?
I mean, are moral values and moral propositions true or false relative to a certain perspective, and is there no absolute perspective of morality?
* I don’t think we can make a conclusive argument for what is the objectively right moral view. Since argumentation is all we have to attain justification then we have to give up the idea of holding the absolutely morally right view. It could exist, but given the tools we use to justify our views we can’t show that we (and not our opponents) have it.
In other matter, you know there is a contemporary debate between atheists (Richard Dawkins, etc.) and theists.
As far I can see, both sides of the debate agree with absolutism, not with relativism. Leaving aside the question of who has better arguments, fact is absolutism is part of analytic philosophy of religion.
However, I've just seen a philosopher of religion named Nick Trakakis who has just published the book "The End of Philosophy of Religion", who defends a position similar to yours (i mean, a position sympathetic to the critical exposing of the assumptions of the positions under debate).
Part II of reply.
You wrote:
I haven't read this book, but in amazon you can read this description "This is an expert examination of the 'meta-philosophy of religion', exposing the limitations of the analytic method and the need to embrace a new continental approach. "The End of Philosophy of Religion" explores the hitherto un-chartered waters of the 'meta-philosophy of religion', that is, the methods and assumptions underlying the divergent ways of writing and studying the philosophy of religion that have emerged over the last century. It is also a first-class study of the weaknesses of the analytic approach in philosophy, particularly when it is applied to religious and aesthetic experience.Nick Trakakis' main line of argument is twofold. Firstly, the Anglo-American analytic tradition of philosophy, by virtue of its attachment to scientific norms of rationality and truth, inevitably struggles to come to terms with the mysterious and transcendent reality that is disclosed in religious practice. Secondly, and more positively, alternatives to analytic philosophy of religion are available, not only within the various schools of so-called Continental philosophy, but also in explicitly narrative and literary approaches. He argues that literature (using examples from Dostoyevsky and Kazantzakis) can often promise greater philosophical insight than what is usually offered in the purely academic and highly professionalized settings of contemporary philosophy.Trakakis expertly shows that continental philosophers do not surrender 'clarity' to analytic philosophy; emphasising instead that one has to distinguish clarity from rigor, (being faithful to the phenomena). When things are ambiguous it distorts them to treat them as if they were clear, but it is rigorous to respect their ambiguity and to attempt to express them in words, like a master poet or novelist. "The End of Philosophy of Religion" proposes that the pervasive analytic approach to the philosophic study of religion is fraught with limitations, and that a new continental approach must be embraced if advances are to be made"
* I might like Trakakis’s book, but some things in that description of it give me pause. Does religion disclose a “mysterious and transcendent reality”? I’m not so sure, although it feels that way. How is “greater philosophical insight” assessed? It seems that any attempt to understand a mode of knowing by another mode of knowing is (or perhaps could be) reductive. I’m tempted by the idea that our supreme interest should be in what makes us a better person, which is a person who acts more rightly in more situations. If the rigor of philosophical analysis does that for someone by creating an illuminating clarity within its own terms then that could be a valuable thing to do. If reading “Zorba the Greek” does that to another then that would be good to do. If sitting the Zen practice zazen does that for another then that could be a good thing to do. And each could do the opposite for someone else: a blowhard narcissist runs around with a copy of “Zorba the Greek.” There’s another new book about science and religion and the New Atheists and Theists by one of my favorite authors Barbara Herrnstein Smith called “Natural Reflections.”
Part III of reply:
Finally, and in other topic, I just read philosopher Alex Rosemberg's blog article on naturalism:
http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disenchanted-naturalists-guide-to-reality/
I think his view tends to be very nihilistic, but he's possibly right that those are the true implications of that worldview.
* Funny you should mention this. I joined a meetup group on Naturalism run by Tom Clark and he referred members to that essay by Rosenberg. Some big names in academia comment on the essay (including Robert Pippin). When I read the essay by Rosenberg I thought it was one of these amateur philosophers on the web who aren’t really knowledgeable about the field. I was surprised to find he’s been a professor for a long time. I don’t think naturalism implies nihilism. Look at Tom Clark’s site on Naturalism. We don’t need God or moral and epistemological absolutes to be accurate and do good.
Jonathan,
Yes, I've read Almaas years ago and even did a retreat. I like his combination of spirituality and psychology. I didn't take to their vocabulary of essences and the different color names for the different essences, but it struck me as good work to do for those who it grabs.
Jeff
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